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Meaning and Scope of the Restrictions Imposed by the 
Mexican Constitution on Ministers of Worship
*
 
Address Given by Jorge Adame Goddard**: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the decision by Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice 
issued in July 2010, declaring that the law permitting marriage between 
persons of the same sex is consistent with the Mexican Constitution, 
several Catholic bishops made statements criticizing the decision. These 
statements generated a strong response from the party promoting the 
legal reform, the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), which filed 
several charges against the bishops, arguing that they had violated the 
Mexican Constitution and various laws. 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze, with reference to this case, 
the content of the constitutional restrictions affecting ministers of 
worship, particularly those against engaging in proselytism and opposing 
the laws and institutions, which are the restrictions allegedly violated in 
the case, and to propose an interpretation of these restrictions that is fully 
consistent with the Mexican Constitution and with current human rights 
doctrine. To this end, I will first present the case (Part I), and then 
present the constitutional and legal precepts that were allegedly violated 
(Part II); I will then detail the restrictive—and in my opinion 
antidemocratic—interpretation given to these precepts by the accusers 
(Part III), and conclude by proposing the interpretation that I judge to be 
consistent with the Mexican Constitution and human rights doctrine (Part 
IV); finally, I will present a few brief conclusions by way of summary 
(Part V). 
 
*  This address was originally presented at the Eighteenth International Law and Religion 
Symposium, organized by Brigham Young University, in Provo, Utah, which took place in October 
2010. 
 ** Institute for Legal Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico. 
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A. The Case 
In August 2010, Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice ruled that the 
amendment to the civil code of the Federal District that allows marriages 
between persons of the same sex, as well as the adoption of minors by 
such couples, is consistent with the Mexican Constitution. Several 
Catholic bishops and other religious leaders criticized the court’s 
decision, considering it contrary to the ethics of their respective faiths 
and Mexican traditions. Having an especially strong impact on public 
opinion were the views of the Archbishop of Mexico City, Norberto 
Rivera Carrera, and particularly those of his official spokesman, Father 
Hugo Valdemar, and those of the Archbishop of Guadalajara, Cardinal 
Juan Sandoval Íñiguez. Considerable public opinion (that is, opinions 
expressed in the most influential media outlets) and the political party 
behind the disputed reform, the PRD, criticized the statements made by 
these bishops, arguing that they violated Article 130 of the Mexican 
Political Constitution (which establishes the bases for relations between 
religious organizations and the State) and the relevant regulatory law. 
There were even several charges brought before the Ministry of the 
Interior, calling upon it to investigate whether these statements were in 
violation of the law and, if they were, to impose the corresponding 
penalties. Charges were also filed with the Federal Electoral Institute, 
alleging that these criticisms, insofar as they affected a political party, 
violated the Electoral Code. 
1. The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice 
An action of unconstitutionality was filed with the Supreme Court of 
Justice, calling upon it to resolve whether the amendment to the Federal 
District’s civil code to allow marriages between persons of the same sex, 
as well as adoption of minors by such couples, was or was not consistent 
with Mexico’s federal constitution. 
The Plenary Sessions in which this matter was debated were 
broadcast on television. There were several sessions (on August 3, 5, 9, 
10, 12, and 16), at the end of which the ministers declared, by a majority 
of nine votes to two, that the amendment was constitutional. In brief, the 
court found in favor of the constitutionality of the amendment, that same-
sex marriages entered into in the Federal District would have to be 
respected in all other Mexican states and that same-sex couples were 
entitled to adopt. 
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The press release issued by the Supreme Court outlined a number of 
reasons for its decision: that marriage is not a “predetermined concept 
immune to legislation,” and thus may be freely defined to include unions 
between homosexual persons; that homosexual relations “are totally 
comparable to heterosexual relations”; that the Constitution “protects all 
types of families” and that marriage between a man and woman is not 
“the only way of forming one.” With regard to the validity of same-sex 
marriages in other Mexican states, the Court added that Article 121, 
subsection IV should apply, which stipulates that marriages entered into 
in one state must be respected in all other states of the country. With 
regard to the adoption of children by same-sex couples, it was 
determined “that it does not infringe any constitutional guarantees,” and 
that what the law must guarantee is that the adoption is the best life 
option for the minor “irrespective of the sexual orientation” of those 
seeking to adopt, whether they are single persons or heterosexual or 
homosexual married couples.  
2. The declarations 
On August 15, at the end of a ceremony celebrating the Assumption 
of Mary, in the city of Aguascalientes, with the participation of the 
Archbishop and Cardinal of Guadalajara, Juan Sandoval Íñiguez, the 
cardinal was asked for his opinion regarding the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Justice in relation to the constitutionality of same-sex marriages. 
According to a report in the August 15 edition of the newspaper 
Reforma, the cardinal answered: “I have no doubt that they (the judges) 
are well ‘fed’1 by [Mexico City Federal District Head of Government, 
Marcelo] Ebrard. They are well ‘fed’ by international organizations.” “I 
don’t believe that [the Ministers of the Court] would have reached these 
absurd conclusions, which run counter to the sentiments of the Mexican 
people, without very big motives. And the very big motive could be the 
money they are given,” he added. 
The other national daily newspaper, La Jornada, reproduced these 
words as being the cardinal’s:  
This (the decision of the Supreme Court validating same-sex marriage) 
is an aberration, which responds to international interests that pursue 
 
 1. Translator’s Note: the word used by the cardinal in Spanish is “maiceados” (lit. “fed with 
corn”); the original meaning of the word relates to feeding animals, but in colloquial Mexican 
Spanish, it is generally used to refer to people who have been bribed. 
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the Malthusian purposes of the very highest economic and advertising 
powers, which pursue evil purposes and are committed to the reduction 
of the world’s population, especially in the Third World, because they 
say that we are using up the world’s resources, and they’ve been 
launching a series of measures for several years now such as 
contraception, abortion, free love, the perversion of children and 
youths, the morning-after pill, quick divorce and marriage between 
homosexuals, who of course are sterile, which pursue these Malthusian 
purposes orchestrated from the highest levels, which are very well paid. 
Subsequently, on September 23, in the Guadalajara Archdiocese’s 
weekly newsletter, Semanario Arquidiocesano de Guadalajara, the 
cardinal published the following statement: 
This is a series of laws (related to same-sex marriage and others) that 
are immoral, very harmful to the country, which if put into practice will 
severely damage the life of this nation and the institution of 
marriage. . . . These are dictatorial laws, contrary to democracy; they 
denigrate the representative nature of governors and legislators, who do 
not have absolute power, but the power given them by the people they 
represent . . . . 
On Monday, August 16, according to a report by the newspaper El 
Universal, Father Hugo Valdemar, official spokesman for the 
Archbishopric of Mexico City, declared that  
the laypeople now have the “green light” from the Catholic Church to 
take any actions they have to and raise public awareness of the fact that 
the author of all this is the Head of Government of the Federal District, 
Marcelo Ebrard. He and his government have created laws that destroy 
the family, that do worse harm than the drug trade. Marcelo Ebrard and 
his party, the PRD, have undertaken to destroy us. The Church will not 
do it, because it is not within its jurisdiction, but the laypeople will take 
on the task of raising awareness among the citizens so that at the next 
elections in the Federal District they can vote responsibly. That is, 
when the time comes to vote, they can do so in a reasoned manner, 
considering that they should not vote for pernicious parties like the 
Democratic Revolution Party, which act against faith and morality. 
3. The reactions 
Monday, August 16, in response to the declarations of Cardinal Juan 
Sandoval, the ministers of the Court published Press Release #185/2010, 
in which they stated 
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The Plenary Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) issued a 
vote of censure against the declarations of the Archbishop of 
Guadalajara, whereby he questioned the integrity both of this High 
Court and of its members, in relation to the debate held over same-sex 
marriages and the possibility of same-sex couples adopting.2 
Another paragraph was also published, expressing the personal 
position of the minister Sergio Valls, author of the provisional decision, 
who considered that “in a secular State such as ours, there must be 
absolute separation between the church and the State, as set forth in 
Article 130 of the Constitution.” 
In general, the biggest media outlets criticized the declaration of 
Cardinal Sandoval that the ministers and the Head of Government of the 
Federal District had been “fed” (“maiceados” in Spanish), because they 
interpreted this word in the sense of having been bribed with money. The 
Head of Government of the Federal District even filed a claim against the 
cardinal for “personal injury,” i.e., for harm to his reputation, which is 
currently in court. I will not examine this issue, which has more to do 
with respect for the moral integrity of a person than with religious 
freedom. 
But there was also a significant current of opinion supporting the 
view expressed by Minister Valls, that in a secular State, bishops should 
not express opinions on public matters. Moreover, two members of the 
Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Mexican Congress) filed a 
charge with the Ministry of the Interior alleging that the declarations of 
Cardinal Sandoval and Father Hugo Valdemar violated the Constitution 
and the Law of Religious Organizations and Public Worship, and thus 
petitioned the Ministry of the Interior to admit the charge, investigate the 
case and, if applicable, impose the corresponding penalty. The national 
leader of the Democratic Revolution Party filed another similar charge. 
Specifically, there were two accusations made: (i) “political 
proselytism” against the Democratic Revolution Party; and (ii) 
“opposing” the law of the Federal District that allows marriage between 
homosexuals, and the decision of the Supreme Court, which would mean 
opposing this institution. 
 
 2. Comunicado de Prensa 185/2010, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, (Aug. 16, 
2010), available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/comunicado.asp?id= 
1895. 
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B. The Laws Allegedly Violated 
The charges state that the declarations are in violation of Article 130, 
paragraph e of the Constitution, the Law of Religious Organizations and 
Public Worship, and the Federal Code of Electoral Procedures and 
Institutions. 
1. Article 130 of the Constitution 
The allegedly violated precept is paragraph e of this article, which 
literally states:  
 
Ministers may not join any association with political purposes or engage in 
proselytism for or against any political candidate, party or association. 
Furthermore they may not, in public meetings, in acts of worship or religious 
propaganda, or in publications of a religious nature, oppose the laws of the 
country or its institutions, or in any way denigrate national symbols. 
 
Of the various restrictions imposed by this article, there are only two 
in dispute in this case: (i) the restriction against engaging in “proselytism 
for or against any political candidate, party or association,” and (ii) the 
restriction against opposing “the laws of the country or its institutions”. 
To better understand the meaning of these restrictions, it is useful to 
consider them in relation to the original text of the article, particularly 
paragraphs nine and thirteen, in order to identify the differences between 
this text, which is extremely restrictive, and the more liberal, current text. 
The original text stated that ministers of worship (¶ 9) “shall not 
have the right to vote or to stand for election, or to join any association 
with political purposes.” The amended text now grants them the right to 
vote, but introduced a new restriction, against engaging in proselytism 
for or against any party or candidate, without specifying the 
circumstances of time and place in which this prohibition is to have 
effect. 
The original text of 1917 included a restriction on freedom of the 
press, which applied not to authors themselves but to “periodical 
publications of a religious nature,” which were prohibited from (¶ 13) 
“commenting on national political matters,” “reporting the acts of the 
authorities of the country, or of individuals, which are directly associated 
with the operations of public institutions.” The current text no longer 
contains a general prohibition against publications, but one applicable 
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only to ministers of worship: that they cannot “oppose the laws of the 
country or its institutions” in “publications of a religious nature.” 
The original text prohibited ministers of worship, in public or private 
meetings or acts of worship or religious propaganda, from making 
“criticisms of the fundamental laws of the country, of any authorities in 
particular, or of the government in general.” The amended text has 
maintained part of this prohibition in the sentence prohibiting ministers 
of worship from opposing “the laws of the country or its institutions,” in 
public meetings, in acts of worship or religious propaganda, or, as 
mentioned above, in publications of a religious nature. 
This comparison of the two texts sheds some light on the meaning of 
the two current restrictions being considered here. The restriction on 
engaging in proselytism for or against any party or candidate was 
introduced at the same time that ministers of worship were granted the 
right to vote in elections. It is natural that any person with a right to vote 
would talk with others about candidates and parties, and it would be 
absurd for this to be prohibited by the constitution. This is why it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of “engaging in proselytism.” 
The restriction against “opposing” the laws and institutions of the 
country becomes clear when we consider that the original text prohibited 
making “criticisms of the fundamental laws of the country,” not of any 
law, or making criticisms of “any authorities in particular,” i.e., members 
of the government (which is omitted in the amended version), and 
making criticisms “of the government in general,” which in the amended 
text would be “the institutions.” If the new text, from the perspective of 
human rights, constitutes an improvement on the previous text, the 
prohibition against “opposing” cannot be understood in the sense of 
“making criticisms” of any law or any institution. I will examine this 
point and the meaning of “engaging in proselytism” in Part IV. 
These two restrictions have been included, with a few modifications, 
in two federal laws: the Law of Religious Organizations and Public 
Worship (Law of Religious Organizations), which includes both 
prohibitions, and the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and 
Procedures (Electoral Code), which includes only the restriction related 
to political parties. 
2. The Law of Religious Organizations and Public Worship 
This law, which regulates Article 130 of the Constitution, states (in 
Art. 8-I) that religious organizations must “[a]lways be subject to the 
Constitution and the laws arising therefrom, and respect the institutions 
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of the country.” Article 14 repeats the prohibition against ministers of 
worship joining “associations with political purposes, as well as 
engaging in proselytism for any political candidate, party or 
organization.” Then, under the fifth title on offenses and penalties (Art. 
29), it indicates the following as punishable offenses against the law by 
“those subject to the terms set forth herein”: “engaging in proselytism or 
propaganda of any kind for or against any political candidate, party or 
association” (subsection I). 
A close reading of the text of this law reveals certain discrepancies 
with the text of the constitution. In the section related to political parties, 
the text of the constitution prohibits “engaging in proselytism,” while 
Article 29-I of the law identifies engaging not only in proselytism but 
also in “propaganda of any kind” for or against a party or candidate as a 
punishable offense. The prohibition in the law is more extensive than the 
constitutional prohibition as it includes another activity, not covered in 
the Constitution, which raises the question of whether this addition is 
valid or not, since according to Article 1 of the Constitution, the 
fundamental guarantees can only be restricted by the Constitution itself. 
(I will examine this question in Part IV.) 
The Law of Religious Organizations covers the constitutional 
prohibition against “opposing” the laws and institutions of the country, 
but defines it in subsection X in the following terms: “opposing the laws 
of the country or its institutions in public meetings.” There is a 
discrepancy between this text and the Constitution in relation to the 
circumstances: while the Constitution refers to opposition in a public 
meeting, in acts of worship or of religious propaganda, or in publications 
of a religious nature, the law only refers to acts occurring at “public 
meetings.” On this point, the wording of the law proves more benign 
than that of the Constitution, especially given that it does not deem 
oppositions made in printed publications as offenses, raising the question 
of whether the silence of the law eliminates the legal effect of the 
circumstances set forth in the Constitution. 
The penalties for these offenses may be one of the following (Art. 
32), depending on the seriousness and the circumstances of the case: a 
warning, a fine of an amount of up to the equivalent of 20,000 times the 
minimum daily wage, temporary closure of a place of worship, 
temporary suspension of the rights of the religious organization, or 
cancellation of the registration of the religious organization. The 
penalties are imposed by a special committee made up of officials of the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
02-GODDARD.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:39 PM 
705 Ministers of Worship and the Mexican Constitution 
 713 
3. The Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures  
The constitutional restriction is covered in Article 353-1 of the Code 
but in different terms from those used in the Constitution. This article of 
the Code identifies the following as an offense: “[I]nducing voters to 
abstain, to vote for a candidate or political party or not to vote for any of 
them, in places intended for worship, in public spaces or in the media.” 
The offense is no longer engaging in “proselytism,” as stated in the 
Constitution, or in “propaganda,” as added by the Law of Religious 
Organizations, but also includes “inducing” voters to vote for a candidate 
or party and even inducing them to abstain from voting. This is not only 
a different action from that defined in the Constitution, which includes 
the word “inducing” instead of “proselytism,” but Article 353-1 also 
adds a new purpose: in addition to inducing voters to vote or not to vote 
for a party or candidate, it is also an offense to induce them to abstain 
from voting. 
The Electoral Code adds a circumstance that was not provided for in 
the Constitution, which, in relation to the prohibition against engaging in 
proselytism, did not make any specification regarding the place where 
the act should occur,3 while the Electoral Code states that to be deemed 
an offense the “inducing” must occur in a place intended for worship, in 
a public space or “in the media”. 
The above raises the question of whether or not the offense identified 
in the Electoral Code is the same as that set forth in the Constitution; if it 
is the same offense, then a question arises over the validity of the 
restriction on encouraging abstention, which is not referred to in the 
Constitution; if the restriction is different, this would raise the question 
of whether the Electoral Code can restrict political rights that are not 
restricted in the Constitution. 
This Code does not indicate the penalty to be imposed on a minister 
of worship who commits the offense mentioned, leading to the 
assumption that the penalty would have to be imposed by the Ministry of 
the Interior, which is the body with jurisdiction over religious 
 
 3. Paragraph e of Article 130 sets forth the prohibition against engaging in proselytism in a 
sentence that contains no indication of the places where such proselytizing may occur, and it ends 
with a period immediately followed by a new sentence. The sentence that follows sets forth the 
restriction on “opposing” the laws and institutions and indicates various places where such 
opposition may not be expressed: “public meetings,” “acts of worship or religious propaganda,” and 
in “printed publications of a religious nature.” 
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organizations.4 The Electoral Code itself establishes (in Art. 355-4) that 
whenever the Electoral Institute becomes aware of an offense committed 
by a minister of worship or religious organization, it shall inform the 
Ministry of the Interior “to take the corresponding legal action.” 
C. The Restrictive Interpretation Asserted by the Accusers 
The accusers assert that the declarations giving rise to their lawsuit 
violate the Constitution and the laws and should therefore be punished. 
They believe that the freedom of expression of ministers of worship is 
restricted by the terms of Article 130 of the Constitution and also by the 
terms set forth in the laws, as analyzed above, go beyond the 
constitutional provisions. To judge whether this assertion is justified, I 
will now analyze the declarations in light of the applicable legal 
provisions. 
1. Prohibition against engaging in proselytism, propaganda, or inducing 
voters to vote for or against a political party 
The accusers assert that the declaration of the spokesman for the 
Archdiocese of Mexico, Father Hugo Valdemar, constitutes an offense 
against the Law of Religious Organizations, the Electoral Code, and 
Article 130 of the Constitution in relation to engaging in proselytism, 
propaganda, or inducing voters to vote against the Democratic-
Revolution Party (PRD). 
The controversial statement made in this context is as follows: 
The Church will not do it, because it is not within its jurisdiction, but 
the laypeople will take on the task of raising awareness among the 
citizens so that at the next elections in the Federal District they can vote 
responsibly. That is, when the time comes to vote, they can do so in a 
reasoned manner, considering that they should not vote for pernicious 
parties like the Democratic Revolution Party, which act against faith 
and morality.5 
An analysis of the content of this statement reveals that it is not an 
invitation or direct exhortation to vote against the PRD, but it is an 
 
 4. See Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal [LOAPF] [Enabling Law for 
Federal Public Administration], as amended, art. 27 frac. XVIII, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO], 29 de Deciembre de 1976 (Mex.). 
 5. Julián Sánchez, Iglesia llama a votar contra PRD, EL UNIVERSAL, Aug. 17, 2010, 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/179755.html. 
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affirmation that the lay faithful “will take on the task of raising 
awareness among the citizens” so that they can vote in a reasoned 
manner and make them see “that they should not vote for pernicious 
parties like the Democratic Revolution Party.” There is certainly in this 
declaration the statement or expression of a negative opinion of the PRD, 
which is deemed “pernicious” because it acts “against faith and 
morality.” Does this declaration violate the laws? 
Article 130 paragraph e of the Constitution prohibits “engaging in 
proselytism” for or against any party.6 The statement of this negative 
opinion cannot be considered “proselytism,” as it is not an act forming 
part of a series of acts or a process aimed at winning proselytes; it is 
merely the expression of a negative view of a party. Nor can the 
comment that “the laypeople will take on the task of raising awareness 
among the citizens” be considered proselytism, as it is merely the 
expression of a desire regarding the action that may or may not be freely 
undertaken by the lay faithful, who, in any case, in their capacity as 
citizens, may freely promote the political options they prefer and, if they 
so desire, engage in political proselytism. 
From the perspective of the Law of Religious Organizations, which 
in addition to prohibiting proselytism also prohibits “propaganda,”7 it 
could be argued that if “propaganda” is something distinct from 
proselytism, the law has overstepped its bounds because it identifies an 
offense not provided for in the Constitution and, in so doing, restricts 
fundamental rights beyond the terms set forth in fundamental law. 
Pursuant to the prohibition in the Electoral Code against “inducing” 
voters to vote for or against a party, the statement could be deemed an 
offense insofar as it calls upon citizens, if not directly at least indirectly, 
not to vote for a political party; but if “inducing” is an activity distinct 
from proselytism, the Electoral Code has overstepped constitutional 
bounds. 
The declaration might therefore be in violation of the laws but not of 
the Constitution. The question then is whether the law can expand the 
restrictions established in the Constitution. 
 
 6. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 130, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 28 de Enero de 1992 (Mex.). 
 7. Ley de Asociaciones Religiosas y Culto Público [Law of Religious Associations and 
Public Worship], as amended, art. 29 frac. X, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 25 de Mayo de 
2011 (Mex.). 
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2. Prohibition against opposing the laws and institutions 
In the opinion of the accusers, the declarations of Cardinal Juan 
Sandoval constitute an act of opposition to the laws and institutions, and 
therefore violate Article 130 paragraph e of the Constitution and Article 
29-X of the Law of Religious Organizations. 
The cardinal’s declarations (leaving aside those that may constitute 
an offense for personal injury to the Head of Government of the Federal 
District or the ministers of the Supreme Court, which is the object of a 
civil action for liability for personal injury), which may be deemed to 
oppose the institutions and laws, are those that claim the following: that 
the Supreme Court decision contains “absurd conclusions, which run 
counter to the sentiments of the Mexican people,” or that it is an 
“aberration”; that the law allowing same-sex marriages in the Federal 
District and other laws arising from it are “immoral,” “very harmful to 
the life of the country,” “dictatorial,” and “contrary to democracy.”8 
In fact, it seems an exaggeration to claim that such statements may 
be deemed an act of opposition to the laws of the country. This 
conclusion could only be drawn if the constitutional prohibition against 
opposing the laws were understood to mean that ministers of worship 
cannot criticize any law, i.e., interpreting the amended text as much more 
restrictive than the original text, which only prohibited criticism of the 
“fundamental laws.” 
The declarations of Fr. Hugo Valdemar that expressed a negative 
opinion of a political party could also be deemed an act of opposing the 
institutions if it is accepted that the party is one of the institutions of the 
country. According to this position, the constitutional restriction would 
be expanded to include negative criticism of any institution, which would 
again result in a heavier restriction than that set forth in the original text, 
which referred to making criticisms “of the authorities” or “the 
government in general.” 
3. Critique of this interpretation 
The interpretation of the constitutional restrictions established in 
Article 130, paragraph e, asserted by the accusers is essentially as 
 
 8. See id. See also Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as 
amended, art. 6, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 13 de Noviembre de 2007 (Mex.); 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 7, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DO], 20 de Julio de 2007 (Mex.). 
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follows: engaging in proselytism or opposing the laws and institutions of 
the country consists simply of making a declaration expressing a 
negative opinion of any law or institution of the country.  
They maintain that the right to freedom of expression of ministers of 
worship is restricted by this paragraph of Article 130 of the Constitution 
and that this restriction is expanded or developed with the limitations set 
forth in the Law of Religious Organizations and the Electoral Code. 
The result is that ministers of worship do not have the right to free 
expression, except to express positive opinions regarding the institutions 
and laws. Is this conclusion acceptable in a democratic republic? 
The terms in which the right to free expression and publication of 
ideas and opinions are defined in the Mexican Constitution do not admit 
such a conclusion. Article 6 of the Constitution literally states: “The 
expression of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial or administrative 
inquiry, except in cases of offenses against morality or the rights of 
others, provocation of a crime or disturbance of public order.”9 Why then 
is an “administrative inquiry” being pursued in relation to ideas 
expressed by ministers of worship? It would be a gross exaggeration to 
assert that these declarations offend morality, the rights of others 
(remembering that I am not considering the question of personal injury 
here), or that they provoke a crime or disturb public order. Article 7 is no 
less emphatic with regard to freedom of publication. It states: “The 
freedom to write and publish writings on any topic is inviolable,”10 with 
basically the same exceptions as those set forth in Article 6. 
But those who assert the restrictive interpretation allege that any 
declaration by a minister of worship that negatively criticizes any law or 
any institution of the country is a violation of Article 130 and, as such, 
constitutes a “disturbance of public order,” and, consequently, it is an 
exceptional case in which freedom of expression may be restricted. 
Irrespective of the question of the meaning of “public order” in Article 
6,11 it can be asserted that the accusers’ argument is based on an 
 
 9. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 6, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 13 de Noviembre de 2007 (Mex.). 
 10. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 7, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Julio de 2007 (Mex.). 
 11. Id. Given the fact that Art. 6 speaks of “disturbing” public order and Art. 7 speaks of not 
respecting “public peace,” it could be inferred that, in Article 6, public order is understood in the 
sense of public peace or calm that might be “disturbed,” for example by a riot, attack, or similar 
actions; “public order” is not meant in the sense of imperative laws or laws of public order, such as 
constitutional precepts, because these cannot be “disturbed,” but are simply either obeyed or 
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unproven assumption: that the declarations in question violate Article 
130 of the Constitution. Their reasoning is simple: such declarations 
violate the constitution, and, therefore, ministers of worship have no 
right to make them.  
But the issue to be resolved is whether such declarations in fact 
violate the Constitution when the Constitution itself protects freedom of 
expression so broadly and when its first article prohibits discrimination 
on religious grounds (as well as others) with an aim to undermine 
fundamental rights. 
The restrictive interpretation not only violates the right to free 
expression of religious ministers, but it also violates the rights of all 
citizens who are members of religious organizations. In a representative 
democracy such as Mexico,12 citizens participate in public decisions and 
processes through representatives: through deputies and senators in the 
Legislative Branch, and through governors, municipal mayors, 
councilors, and the President of the Republic, who is the representative 
of the nation. But they also participate through representatives of the 
different organizations of which citizens are members: workers 
participate in public processes through union leaders, and through them 
they express opinions on public matters; business leaders do so through 
the heads of the chambers of industry, commerce, or services; college 
students do so through university presidents, and thus each grouping of 
citizens expresses its position through the leaders of its organization. 
For example, to remove the right to free expression of union leaders 
would be to violate the right of workers to free expression on public 
matters through those leaders. Union leaders have the obligation to 
publicly express the opinions of their members so that society at large 
and government agencies will be aware of their points of view and take 
them into account. If their leaders are silenced, union members are 
effectively left without a voice, and thus gagging leaders would be an 
infringement of the individual rights of each worker. If the leaders of a 
union or of any organization make a statement that is not consistent with 
the interests and opinions of union members, it is these members, not the 
government, who may dismiss their representatives or change to another 
organization. 
 
disobeyed. 
 12. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Marzo de 1997 (Mex.). 
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The restrictive interpretation discussed here attempts to strip 
representatives of religious organizations of their right to broadcast the 
points of view and interests of their members with regard to public 
matters. It claims that ministers of worship must not in any way criticize 
the laws, decisions, programs, or performance of political parties. It 
seeks to silence religious leaders, thereby ensuring that the points of view 
and opinions of citizens who are members of registered religious 
organizations are not heard in the public arena. This interpretation thus 
has the perverse effect of discriminating against citizens by reason of 
their religious beliefs, depriving them of the right to publicly express 
their points of view on public matters through their accredited and 
registered representatives before the State. 
In my opinion, this restrictive interpretation is anticonstitutional and 
antidemocratic. It is anticonstitutional because it contradicts the spirit or 
reasoning behind the new Article 130 of the Constitution, as explained in 
the following section, and because it is contrary to Articles 1, 6, and 7 of 
the Fundamental Law. It is anti-democratic because it prevents citizens 
who are members of religious organizations from publicly expressing 
their voice. 
D. An Interpretation Consistent with the Mexican Constitution 
There is currently a general consensus that the Constitution serves to 
protect the fundamental rights of persons, also called human rights. 
Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that “all individuals” 
shall enjoy the rights granted by the Constitution, “which may not be 
restricted or suspended, except in the cases and under the conditions set 
forth herein.”13 This is a principle that is crucial for the analysis of the 
matter examined in this paper: that constitutional guarantees (i.e., 
fundamental rights) cannot be restricted, except in cases with the 
conditions set forth in the Constitution itself. 
The constitutional restrictions on ministers of worship against 
“engaging in proselytism” and “opposing the laws and institutions” can 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Mexican Constitution if 
we dismiss any attempt to interpret them in the restrictive and outdated 
manner implicit in the charges discussed above. In principle, these 
 
 13. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 1, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Junio de 2011 (Mex.). 
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restrictions must be considered valid because they are set forth in the 
Constitution, but it is important to clarify their meaning and scope. 
1. The prohibition against “engaging in proselytism” 
As mentioned above, this prohibition was introduced into the 
Constitution with the reform of 1992, which also gave ministers of 
worship the right to vote. What was it that the constitutional reformers 
sought to prohibit in referring to “proselytism,” without specifying the 
details of place, time, or means by which it might occur? 
The word “proselytism” does not appear in any other article of the 
Constitution and is not a technical legal term; it should therefore be 
interpreted based on its plain meaning. The Diccionario de la Lengua 
Española14 (Dictionary of the Spanish Language) gives it meaning as 
“zeal to win proselytes” and defines “proselyte” as a “convert to a 
faction, party or doctrine.” According to this popular meaning and 
considering the exact context where it appears (the prohibition against 
joining organizations with political purposes), it is clear that the 
prohibition is against ministers of worship engaging in any ongoing 
political activity, i.e., an activity that implies zeal or determination and 
that has the aim of increasing or reducing supporters for a political party, 
candidate, or organization. 
This interpretation of the word proselytism is corroborated by several 
paragraphs of the Chamber of Deputies Report15 that proposed the 
approval of the constitutional reform. The report states that, in the past, 
the Catholic Church (without stating its name) and its ministers of 
worship had “a decisive influence on the direction of the vote” and adds: 
“Today, mobilization of votes is in the hands of the political parties.”16 
The proselytism in which ministers of worship are prohibited from 
engaging is what this paragraph refers to as “mobilization of votes,” 
which is an activity reserved for political parties. Another paragraph of 
the same report states that added to the “restriction on participating in 
 
 14. DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA [SPANISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY] (21st ed. 
1992). 
 15. Cámara de Diputados, DIARIO DE LOS DEBATES [DIARY OF DISCUSSION], 14 de 
Diciembre de 1991 (Mex.). This portion of the report cited can be found in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 
MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], coord., por José Antonio González Fernández et al., 
154 (1992) (Mex.). 
 16. Cámara de Diputados, supra note 15. This portion of the report cited can be found in 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], supra note 15, at 171–2. 
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electoral politics” imposed upon ministers of worship is the prohibition 
against engaging in political proselytism, which effectively confirms that 
it is a restriction on the right to participate in electoral politics.17 
Interpreting this restriction in this way, as a restriction on the right of 
participation in electoral politics rather than a restriction on the right to 
free expression, is consistent with the constitutional principle of the 
separation between the state and the churches; the intention behind this 
restriction is to prevent ministers of worship from participating actively 
in the lives of political parties and electoral processes. It is not a 
restriction on freedom of expression. Therefore, the expression of a 
positive or negative opinion for or against a particular party or candidate 
cannot be considered on its own to be an act of proselytism, as there is no 
evidence of the existence of zeal or determination to win proselytes; if 
the opinion were given repeatedly, it could be considered proselytism 
and therefore a violation of the constitution. On the other hand, a 
minister of worship could engage in proselytism without having to 
publicly express his preferences for or against a party, for example, by 
forming or promoting groups that encourage voters to vote for a 
candidate or to join a particular political party. 
Interpreting the constitutional restriction on proselytism as a 
restriction on the right to participate in electoral politics also clarifies the 
content of this restriction as defined in the Law of Religious 
Organizations and the Electoral Code. In addition to proselytism, this law 
also prohibits “propaganda.”18 This addition is consistent with the first 
article of the Constitution if we understand it to mean not a distinct 
activity from that prohibited by the Constitution, but as a means of 
engaging in proselytism, since “propaganda,” as a continuous and 
ordered activity to attack or promote a party or candidate, is effectively a 
form of proselytizing. Understood in this way, the law does not 
contradict the Constitution, but rather explains its content. 
The prohibition of the Electoral Code against “inducing voters to 
vote or not to vote” for a political candidate or party is a similar case.19 
 
 17. Cámara de Diputados, supra note 15. This portion of the report cited can be found in 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], supra note 15, at 172–3. 
 18. Ley de Asociaciones Religiosas y Culto Público [Law of Religious Associations and 
Public Worship], as amended, art. 29 frac. X, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 25 de Mayo de 
2011 (Mex.). 
 19. Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [COFIPE] [Federal Code 
for Electoral Institutions and Procedures], as amended, art. 353, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
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The Code is not establishing a new prohibition, but simply explaining a 
way of engaging in proselytism; inducing voters to vote a certain way, 
which may be done without expressing or publishing opinions, and 
without the need of public propaganda. However, the Code does overstep 
its bounds when it identifies inducing voters not to vote (i.e., inducing 
abstention) as an offense, as this is not provided for in the Constitution, 
which only prohibits proselytism for or against a party or candidate, but 
makes no statement regarding the promotion of abstention. 
2. The constitutional prohibition against “opposing the laws and 
institutions.” 
In relation to the meaning and scope of this restriction, there are 
several statements in the reports of the two chambers of congress that 
help to clarify its meaning. As mentioned above, the prohibition in the 
original text was against “making criticisms of the fundamental laws of 
the country,” of “the authorities in particular” (meaning members of the 
government), or “the government in general.” Regarding this prohibition, 
the Chamber of Deputies Report states: “The restriction on participating 
in electoral politics should not be confused with holding and maintaining 
social ideas about the national situation and its problems. For this reason, 
the reform eliminates the prohibition against ‘making criticisms’ and 
maintains the requirement of not opposing the Constitution and its 
laws.20 The Senate Report21 contains a similar paragraph,22 which reads:  
On the other hand, the essence of the constitutional mandate prohibiting 
ministers of worship from interfering in political affairs is maintained. 
In this respect, and as the restriction on intervening in electoral politics 
does not imply a restriction on taking a perspective on the national 
situation, the reform proposes to eliminate the prohibition against 
“making criticisms of the fundamental laws of the country” to propose 
a duty not to “oppose the laws of the country and its institutions.” 
 
[DO], 17 de Abril de 2009 (Mex.). 
 20. Cámara de Diputados, supra note 15. This portion of the report cited can be found in 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], supra note 15, at 172–3.  
 21. Dictamen de la Cámara de Senadores, DIARIO DE LOS DEBATES [DIARY OF DISCUSSION], 
20 de Diciembre de 1991 (Mex.), available at http://bit.ly/Nw4uLQ; see DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 
MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], supra note 15, at 183. 
 22. Dictamen de la Cámara de Senadores, supra note 21,  art. IV, frac. 5, pfo. 8; see 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO [MEXICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW], supra note 15, at 196. 
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With some minor differences, the two paragraphs coincide and go far 
to clarify the meaning of the prohibition against opposing the laws and 
institutions. First of all, they clarify that the restriction applies to the right 
to political participation and, more specifically as stated in both reports, 
to participation in “electoral politics.” This is perfectly consistent with 
the other prohibitions contained in Article 130 paragraph e of the 
Constitution: the inability of ministers of worship to stand for election 
and the prohibitions against joining organizations with political purposes 
and engaging in proselytism for or against any party or candidate. These 
are all restrictions on participation in electoral politics. 
Secondly, both reports refer to the elimination of “the prohibition 
against making criticisms,” which is replaced by the prohibition against 
opposing the institutions and laws. This makes it perfectly clear that 
making criticisms of the laws or institutions is not something that the 
authors of the amended text wished to prohibit. This is confirmed by the 
reason that both reports give for eliminating the prohibition against 
“making criticisms.” The Chamber of Deputies Report states that the 
prohibition against ministers of worship “participating in electoral 
politics should not be confused with holding and maintaining ideas about 
the national situation and its problems”; in other words, they have the 
right to hold and maintain such ideas and, the report continues, “for this 
reason the reform eliminates the prohibition against ‘making 
criticisms’. . . .”23 The Senate report uses similar language, stating that 
the “restriction on intervening in electoral politics does not imply a 
restriction on taking a perspective on the national situation,” and it is for 
this very reason that it is proposed to “eliminate the prohibition against 
‘making criticisms’ . . . .”24 
If the constitutional reformers did not wish to prohibit criticism of 
laws and institutions, how should we interpret the prohibition against 
opposing the laws and institutions? 
It is surprising to note that the Mexican Constitution does not 
expressly state the duty of Mexicans25 or of the citizens26 to obey its 
laws or respect its institutions. Obviously, this omission does not mean 
that such duties do not exist (unless we wish to interpret the Constitution 
 
 23. Cámara de Diputados, supra note 15. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 31, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Junio de 2011 (Mex.). 
 26. Id. art. 36. 
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from a highly positivist perspective that only deems as valid what is 
literally stated therein), but should be considered implicit, not only for 
Mexicans but for all foreigners who live on national territory.27 In 
particular, regarding churches and other religious organizations, the final 
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 130 does state that they “shall 
observe the law.”28 In relation to this sentence, opposing the law would 
mean not to observe it, i.e., to disobey it. Obviously, not only ministers 
of worship but also any member of a religious organization or citizen 
who does not obey the law will have to face the corresponding penalties. 
The prohibition against opposing the laws or institutions could mean that 
a minister of worship who disobeys any laws or legally issued orders will 
be punished by the same laws, but this would not be a prohibition distinct 
from the general duty to respect the law applicable to any person. 
In a democratic and representative republic (such as that established 
for Mexico under Article 40 of the Constitution),29 political opposition is 
an essential part of the democratic system and of the human rights 
regime. Democracy allows for a governing party and opposition parties, 
and any attempt to disallow political opposition would be completely 
anti-democratic. The rules of democracy establish resources and 
institutional channels for the opposition to express itself and, potentially, 
to assume government. In Mexican democracy, the citizens have the 
means to oppose any acts of government they consider harmful, such as 
by complaints to human rights commissions or appeals against acts of 
members of government or even against laws; the vote itself is exercised 
as a form of opposition (or ratification) of the government in power, and 
the regime of freedom of expression and publication of ideas30 is another 
means that guarantees that opposition can be peacefully expressed. All 
these forms or acts of opposition are not only permitted, but are an 
integral and essential part of a democratic republic. Nor can these 
resources be withheld from ministers of worship, who have every right to 
 
 27. Article 33 of the Constitution, the only one dedicated exclusively to foreigners, states that 
they shall enjoy the constitutional guarantees, but that the Executive Branch may deport them 
“without need of prior trial” if it determines that their staying in Mexico “is not advisable.” But it 
does not state that they have the duty to respect the laws and institutions; it only prohibits them from 
“interfering in the political affairs of the country.” 
 28. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.],  as amended, art. 130, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Junio de 2011 (Mex.). 
 29. Id. art. 40. 
 30. Id. arts. 6, 7. 
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file complaints or administrative appeals, or to petition against acts of the 
authorities, and also, as granted under the constitutional reform of 1992, 
the right to vote. Therefore, the prohibition against ministers of worship 
opposing the laws and institutions cannot mean that they do not have the 
right to make use of the institutional channels available to oppose acts or 
laws which they consider detrimental to their personal rights or to the 
national community. They have the same rights—and the same duties—
as any other citizen. 
The only opposition that can be prohibited in a democratic 
constitution, which in itself contains the mechanisms to establish a 
political opposition, is opposition by undemocratic means, i.e., via non-
legal channels. This is the content of the constitutional precept and of the 
regulatory law interpreted from a democratic perspective respectful of 
the human rights of Mexicans who practice as ministers of worship or 
who are members of the registered religious organizations that are 
recognized as an integral part of the nation under Article 130 of the 
Constitution. 
The above is corroborated by the wording of Article 130 itself, as it 
prohibits opposing “the laws” and “the institutions.” It does not prohibit 
any law in particular or any institution in particular, but all of them as a 
whole: all of the “laws,” or the legal system, and all of the “institutions,” 
or the institutional system. Opposition through non-legal, undemocratic 
channels would be a genuine opposition to the law as a whole, as the 
channels established by the legal system are rejected, and to judge the 
institutional system incapable of self-correction is truly to oppose it. 
As the constitutional prohibition refers to opposition made at public 
meetings, it seems to be referring to a minister promoting opposition via 
non-legal channels. This would mean inciting criminal activity against 
the political system of the kind defined in the Federal Criminal Code, 
which are the crimes of sedition, rebellion, or sabotage.31 This seems to 
me to be the only meaning consistent with democracy and human rights 
that the prohibition against opposing the laws and institutions could 
have. 
However, since opposition via nonlegal channels constitutes a crime 
that is prohibited for any citizen or foreigner, what would be the point of 
including this prohibition specifically for ministers of worship in the 
 
 31. Código Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, arts. 130–45, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 24 de Octubre de 2011 (Mex.). 
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Constitution? The fact that the Constitution prohibits this opposition 
expressly for ministers of worship has a very clear legal effect: a minister 
of worship who engages in opposition via nonlegal channels violates the 
constitution, while an ordinary citizen who does so violates only the 
criminal code. This proves that the responsibility of ministers of worship 
is greater than that for other citizens. Moreover, pursuant to the Law of 
Religious Organizations, opposition by ministers of worship via nonlegal 
channels could result in the organization to which they belong being 
penalized, which is not applicable to other citizens, regardless of whether 
they are members of a religious organization. 
Interpreting the constitutional prohibition against opposing the laws 
not as a prohibition against “making criticisms,” which was eliminated 
with the constitutional reform of 1992, but as a prohibition against 
opposition by undemocratic means aggravates the guilt of any ministers 
of worship who violate it and results in a prohibition that guarantees 
democracy and the institutional system, thus maintaining the due 
separation between the State and the churches. 
E. Conclusions 
In summary, the restrictive interpretation asserted by the accusers of 
the ministers of worship, who criticized the law admitting same-sex 
marriages and the decision of the Supreme Court that upheld it, is an 
anticonstitutional and antidemocratic interpretation. 
The restrictions imposed by Article 130 of the Constitution are not 
restrictions on the right to free expression and publication of the ideas of 
ministers of worship, or on the right to free expression of the citizens 
who belong to religious organizations, but restrictions on the right of 
ministers of worship to participate in electoral politics. 
This interpretation of these restrictions on ministers of worship is 
fully consistent with the Constitution and its respect for fundamental 
rights and is a suitable means of guaranteeing that the guiding principle 
of Article 130 of the Constitution, which is the separation of the State 
and the churches, is followed. 
 
